Most far right parties failed to achieve the electoral wins they had hoped for, but this lens ignores the other routes through which their ideas are gaining ground in European politics.
Ahead of the June 2024 European elections, in which far-right parties once again seemed poised to make significant gains, much analysis revolved around the question: “Can the centre hold?”.
Many of those covering the elections failed to resist the temptation of this trope (mea culpa – I was among them). It was a lens that continued to be used in the aftermath of the vote, as commentators debated the state of the “centre” in the wake of the far-right’s strong showing in several countries.
But this popular framing may have got in the way of understanding the real impact of the far right on European politics. This is because it assumed the existence of a static, stable political “centre” that risks being eroded by the far right if they acceded to positions of power in high enough numbers, tipping the scales in their favour. Instead, argued populism expert Cas Mudde, analysts should be asking: “which centre will hold?”
While far-right wins fell short of many dire predictions, the latent impact of their increased popularity is likely to be felt in many different ways. As Mudde told the Guardian, “in this respect, the elections tell a less positive story. After all, the biggest group in the new parliament, the EPP [European People’s Party], adopted the key issues and frames of the far right in its campaign and will govern in a more rightwing manner than before – with or without the help of the divided far right.”
Recent experience has shown that far-right parties and figures do not need to be in power for the policies they espouse to be pursued. Policies on migration and asylum are a striking illustration of this. In the Netherlands, it was a coalition led by the liberal People’s Party for Freedom and Democracy (VVD) which adopted the policy of housing migrants in prisons and proposals to narrowly limit family reunification rights. Greece’s centre-right government has overseen detention conditions and pushbacks at sea denounced by human rights organisations. The Conservative Party in the UK introduced legislation to deport all migrants arriving by boat to Rwanda. Poland’s centre-right government, despite expectations it would be more progressive than its predecessor, has maintained the country’s hard line and restrictions on access to asylum for irregular arrivals on its territory (with the exception of those arriving from Ukraine). Governments of various stripes (not including far-right parties) in Belgium, Ireland, and France opted not to provide accommodation in sufficient quantity for migrants not deemed “vulnerable” – leaving them on the streets. Perhaps most shocking of all has been the rhetoric and policies of Denmark’s centre-left and liberal coalition, which has sought to return refugees arriving from Syria and implement remote detention of asylum-seekers.
In countries across Europe, the evidence suggests that the far right has won the argument on migration without needing to win elections and assume power in the executive. And at a European level, it is a similar picture. In April, the European Parliament adopted the Pact on Migration and Asylum, despite strong concerns from rights organisations. While this “centre” – made up largely of Conservative and Social Democrat legislators – seems to have held, progressive forces are left wondering whether other policy areas will suffer the same fate as migration in the upcoming term.
Reliance on notions of the centre holding for apprehending post-election configurations therefore puts us at risk of missing the fact that European politics may already have lost its balance.
Photo by Immo Wegman via Unsplash.com
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